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LENIENCY FOR TESTIMONY: HYPOCRISY OR
JUDICIAL NECESSITY?

I. INTRODUCTION
Does justice prevail when criminals are given a lighter sentence in
exchange for information? Quid pro quo plea bargaining arrangements
have been historically prevalent and are well established in our system of
justice.' Recently, however, this concept has come under scrutiny in
light of the Tenth Circuit's holding in United States v. Singleton.2
When a defendant is confronted by a government prosecutor and
offered a downward departure from the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
(U.S.S.G.) in exchange for testimony, a potentially coercive environment
is created.3 This coercive environment is created when a witness is
'See United States v. Ware, 161 F.3d 414, 419 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Whiskey
Cases dating plea bargaining process back to common law England). This process has
been adopted by the United States and recognized by the courts, the Congress, and the
Sentencing Commission. Id. See United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 315
(5th Cir. 1987) (setting forth well established practice of plea bargaining leniency for
testimony); The Whiskey Cases 99 U.S. 594, 604 (1878) (acknowledging ancient practice of plea bargaining or "power of pardon").
2See United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998), rev'd en banc,
165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999), petition for cert. filed, U.S.L.W. (U.S. Mar. 31, 1999)
(No. 98-8758), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 2371 (U.S. June 21, 1999) (No. 98-8758). (setting
forth history of claim). The defendant in the present claim was convicted in the United
States District Court of Kansas for money laundering and conspiring to distribute cocaine. Id. at 1298. On appeal, a panel of the Tenth Circuit reversed the decision by
implementing a novel interpretation of Section 201(c)(2). Id. It is this panel decision
that has generated intense scrutiny by contradicting the historically accepted practice of
plea-bargaining, most notably, the agreement involving the exchange of leniency for
testimony. Id. On rehearing en banc, the court vacated the panel decision and reheard
the claim. Id. The en banc court held that Section 201(c)(2) does not apply to the United
States government or Assistant United States Attorney's functioning within the scope of
their office. Id.
3 See Justin M. Lungstrum, Note, United States v. Singleton: Bad Law Made in the
Name of a Good Cause, 47 KAN. L. REV. 749, 750 (1999) (indicating potentially coercive environment created surrounding offer of leniency made to defendant for downward
departure). It is a prosecutor-dominated relationship where the defendant must cooperate
with the prosecutor and appear as a testimonial witness to receive the agreed upon leniency. Id. at 751. The prosecutor, however, is under no obligation to reward the defen-
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strongly motivated to falsify or embellish testimony to curry favor with
the prosecutor.4 A defendant facing serious criminal charges who has
first-hand information regarding the criminal activity of others is in a
better position than he would be without such information.5 Prosecutors
typically enter into plea bargain arrangements and grant the defendant
leniency when, after court evaluation, it is shown the witness's testimony
has proven to be of substantial assistance to the prosecutor.6 Section
5Kl.1 of the U.S.S.G. allows a reduction in the sentence of a defendant
dant if the prosecution shows the testimony given has not risen to the level of substantial
assistance. Id.
' See id. at 750; see also Cervantes-Pacheco,826 F.2d at 315 (indicating witnesses' proclivity to falsify evidence to curry favor with government prosecutors). The
motivation to falsify evidence to receive a reduced sentence is implicit in a situation
where a witness faces incarceration. Id. See also United States v. Meinster, 619 F.2d
1041, 1045 (4th Cir. 1980) (noting motivation to falsify testimony). "It is obvious that
promises of immunity or leniency premised on cooperation in a particular case may
provide a strong inducement to falsify in that case." Id.
5
See Daniel C. Richman, Note, CooperatingClients, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 69, 77
(1995) (pointing to willingness of many defendants to exchange valuable information for
sentencing discount).
6 See Julie Gyurci, Note, ProsecutorialDiscretionto Bring a SubstantialAssis-

tance Motion Pursuantto a Plea Agreement: Enforcing a Good FaithStandard, 78
MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1258 (1994) (recognizing majority of downward departures constitutes "substantial assistance" departures under Section 5KI. I of U.S.S.G.); see also Lisa
M. Farabee, Note, DisparateDeparturesUnder the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A
Tale of Two Districts,30 CONN. L. REV. 569, 575 (1998) (noting rigid construction of
U.S.S.G.). Section 5Kl.I defines a judge's power to depart from the U.S.S.G. and allows the judge to take into consideration a defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person. Id. Section 5Kl.1 has become a crucial
mechanism for avoiding the rigiciity of the U.S.S.G. Id. See also U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5KI (1998) (setting forth criteria for departure from U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines for substantial assistance to authorities). Section 5KI.1 provides
in pertinent part:
[Ulpon motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided
substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person
who has committed an offense, the court may depart from the guidelines.
(a) The appropriate reduction shall be determined by the court for reasons
stated that may include, but are not limited to, consideration of the following:
(1) the court's evaluation of the significance and usefulness of the defendant's assistance; taking into consideration the government's evaluation of
the assistance rendered;
(2) the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or
testimony provided by the defendant;
(3) the nature and extent of the defendant's assistance;
(4) any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the defendant or
his family resulting from his assistance;
(5) the timeliness of the defendant's assistance.
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if, after evaluation of the court, the information supplied by the defendant is material, significant and useful in the investigation or prosecution
of another.7 Recently, the scope of § 5Kl.1 has been questioned due to
the language set forth in Title 18, § 201(c)(2) of the United States Code
(Section 201(c)(2)). 8
This controversy stems from the holding in United States v. Singleton,9 and has stirred nationwide interest as defense attorneys feverishly file what have come to be known as "Singleton Motions."' 0 These
motions seek to suppress testimony procured by government prosecutors
claiming such testimony is a product of bribery in direct contravention of
Section 201(c)(2). Section 201(c)(2) prohibits offering anything of value
for, or because of, testimony. 1'
In Singleton, the defendant was convicted of money laundering
and conspiring to distribute cocaine. 12 The Assistant U.S. Attorney violated Section 201(c)(2) by offering leniency to a co-defendant in exchange for truthful testimony.1 3 On appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals applied a novel interpretation of Section 201(c)(2).14 On rehearing en banc, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit reversed the decision, holding that the term "whoever"

7
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL SECTION 5Kl.1 (1998) (explaining substantial assistance provision).
8 See 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2)(West 1999) (addressing bribery and gratuitous trans-

fers to public officials and witnesses). Section 201(c)(2) provides in pertinent part:
[W]hoever... directly or indirectly, gives, offers or promises anything of
value to any person, for or because of the testimony under oath or affirmation given or to be given by such person as a witness upon trial,
hearing, or other proceeding, before any court.., authorized by the laws
of the United States to hear evidence or take testimony shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than two years or both.
Id.
, 165 F.3d at 1298.
'"See id. at 1299 (explaining Singleton Motion used to suppress testimony of government witness for violating meaning of Section 201 (c)(2)).
" See id. at 1300 (explaining rationale behind Singleton Motion).
12 See id. at 1298 (noting subject matter of arrest).
'3 See Singleton 165 F.3d at 1298 (highlighting circumstances
surrounding conviction).
'See id. (noting controversial reading of Section 201 (c)(2)). The Appeals Court
broadly construed the term "whoever" stating Assistant U.S. Attorneys are within the
statute's scope. Id. at 1299. Such an application would forbid Assistant U.S. Attorney's
from offering leniency in exchange for truthful testimony and undermine a well established practice ingrained in our legal system. Id.
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does not include the United States acting in its sovereign capacity. 5 This
means that Assistant U.S. Attorneys, acting as alter egos of the United
States government, are excluded from Section 201(c)(2) and may offer
leniency to a defendant in exchange for truthful testimony.' 6 Since the
Tenth Circuit panel issued their opinion in Singleton, three circuits have
adopted this view and rejected the notion that government plea agreements violate Section 201(c)(2).' 7
This note analyzes the history of Section 201(c)(2) and the problem arising from advocating a literal reading of the statute against a
longstanding, historically accepted practice.' 8 This controversy focuses9
on whether the government is included in the statutory class "whoever."
Part II of this Note outlines the history surrounding Section 201(c)(2). 20
Part HI(a) discusses the analysis and statutory interpretation used in the
Singleton decision.2 ' Part I(b) acknowledges the apparent danger of
obtaining false testimony to curry favor and maximize leniency. 22
The Singleton issue continues to plague criminal defense attorneys who realize if the situation was reversed and they were found to
have induced or attempted to have induced a witness to testify, there
would be serious disciplinary ramifications. 23 The main issue of Singles

See Singleton 165 F.3d at 1299-1300 (stressing government's prosecutorial

power exercised solely through Assistant U.S. Attorneys or Department of Justice officers).
16See id. at 1300 (holding government not included within scope of Section
201(c)(2)); e.g., United States v. Lowery, 166 F.3d 1119, 1121-24 (1lth Cir. 1999) (rejecting claim that prosecutors violated Section 201(c)(2) reversing district court's holding); Unites States v. Ramsey, 165 F.3d 980, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (rejecting claim of §
201(c)(2) violation); United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 358 (5th Cir. 1998) (similarly rejecting claim on merits).
1 See United States v. Haese, 162 F.3d 359, 366-67 (5th Cir. 1998) (disagreeing
with appellate court decision in Singleton noting opinion renders most federal prosecutors criminally liable); United States v. Ware, 161 F.3d 414,418-25 (6th Cir. 1998) (rejecting appellate decision in Singleton noting historical acceptance of exchange of leniency for truthful testimony).
'aSee supra notes 1-17 and accompanying text.
1 See Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1348 (contrasting narrow, plain meaning approach
against notion that text must expressly include government to apply).
20See infra notes 25-42 and accompanying text
21 See infra notes 43-61 and accompanying text.

22See

infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.

" See Harvard Law Review Association, Note, A Prosecutor'sDuty to Disclose
Promises of FavorableTreatment Made to Witnesses For the Prosecution,94 HARV. L.
REV. 888, 889 (1981) (portraying disparity in power between prosecutors and defense
attorneys attributable to differing roles and duties). A prosecutor seeks justice and is not
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ton focuses the statutory language of Section 201(c)(2) and whether the
government falls under the statutory class "whoever." 24

II. HISTORY
Exchanging leniency for testimony continues to be a flourishing
practice in our legal system.25 Despite the statutory language remaining
the same since the statute's inception in 1962, there is still no uniform
interpretation of the Section 201(c)(2) more than three decades later.26
The rules governing the lawyer's conduct makes no distinction between
prosecutors and defense counsel regarding the issue of offering promises,
rewards, or inducements for testimony.27 The minority position, follow-

concerned solely with winning the case. Id. To grant the defendant the same bargaining
power would result in widespread abuse where the main focus is to preserve personal
freedom and avoid incarceration. Id. at 889. See also United States v. Dailey, 759 F.2d
192, 200 (1st Cir. 1985) (maintaining need for jury notification regarding testimony of
accomplices who have entered plea agreements); United States v. Grimes, 438 F.2d 391,
394 (6th Cir. 1971) (questioning credibility of testimony by government witness paid on
contingent fee arrangement); Paying the Witness: Why is it OKfor the Prosecution,but
not the Defense?, 11 WTR CRIM. JUST. 21, 22-23 (Winter, 1997)(indicating liberal
approach of courts admitting testimony of prosecution witnesses paid to testify). This
includes those individuals who receive promises, inducements, or rewards in exchange
for testimony even when the extent of leniency is contingent upon the materiality and
usefulness of testimony. Id.
24 See 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) (West 1999) (addressing controversial interpretation
of statutory language); Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1348 (observing narrow reading of statute).
26
See United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 1987) (describing common practice of plea bargaining). The Cervantes-Pachecocourt states:
No practice has been more ingrained in our criminal justice system than
the practice of the government calling a witness who is an accessory to the
crime for which the defendant is charged and having that witness testify
under a plea bargain that promises him a reduced sentence.
Id. See also United States v. Ford, 99 U.S. 594, 604-605 (1878) (noting practice of "approvement" under English common law where accused could implicate accomplice for
pardon).
2See Pub. L. No. 87-849, § 1(a), 76 Stat. 1119, 1120 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §
201(h)) (effective Oct. 23, 1962) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2)) (West 1999).
See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(b) cmt. (1997). Model
Rule 3.4(b)cmt. provides in pertinent part: "[A] lawyer shall not falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law." Id. The comment explains it is not improper to pay a witness's expenses or to compensate an expert witness on terms permitted by law. Id. The common
law rule in most jurisdictions is that it is improper to pay an expert witness a contingent
fee. Jeffrey Standen, Note, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L.
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ing the "plain meaning" approach to statutory interpretation, believes the
plain meaning of the word "whoever" includes the government acting in
its sovereign capacity. 2s It is a basic tenet of statutory interpretation that
courts follow the plain and unambiguous meaning of statutory
language.29 In interpreting the legislative intent behind statutory construction, a word cannot be analyzed in isolation. 30 The exception to this
rationale surfaces when the meaning of the word taken in isolation is
clear and indisputable.3
The plea bargaining process predates the drafting of the United
States Constitution and continues to be upheld on the theory that the
relative equality of the bargaining power between the prosecutor and
defendant prevents the process from being fundamentally unfair.32 These
plea bargaining arrangements are typically entered into before sentencing
pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 1l(e).33 Plea bargaining
arrangements may also be made up to one year after the sentencing of the
defendant pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b).3 The
REV. 1471, 1504 (1993) (asserting no increase in prosecutorial discretion despite judicial

acceptance of leniency for testimony).
2 See Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1298 (noting argument set forth alleging government
included in statutory interpretation).
See Salinas v. United States, 552 U.S. 52, 55 (1997) (indicating proclivity of
courts to follow unambiguous meaning of statutory language when applying criminal
laws); see also Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982) (quoting
United States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc. 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940)). "There is,
of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by
which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes." Id.
See Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993) (holding courts must view
statutory language in its entirety to determine meaning of individual word); see also
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997) (analyzing statutory language to
determine level of ambiguity); National Coal Ass'n v. Charter, 81 F.3d 1077, 1081 (11 th
Cir. 1996) (stating ordinary meaning given to terms not defined within statute).
S See Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 383 (1937) (noting general wording
of statute precludes government unless language clearly expresses inclusion).
32 See Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 570 (1980) (discussing vital role of
informer); Santabello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971) (explaining informer's
vital role in reducing crime, especially narcotics trade). The government recognizes this
role and states it is fully appropriate to encourage such behavior by offering leniency in
exchange for cooperation. Id. See also Lungstrom, supra note 3, at 751-52 (discussing
Rex v. Rudd, 98 Eng. Rep. 1114 (K.B. 1775) (describing act of issuing equitable pardon)).
33See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (e) (explaining how Rule 11 plea bargains can also be
entered into).
,See Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b) (explaining sentence reductions may be made due to

changed circumstances).
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court may reduce a defendant's sentence under the "substantial assistance" theory if the government files a motion. 35 Furthermore, it is important to note that a promise to recommend leniency is discretionary
and does not guarantee the defendant favorable treatment.36
Accordingly, when government-procured testimony is admitted,
the defendant is entitled to present evidence of promises of leniency in
exchange for testimony.37 This maintains the defendant's fundamental
Due Process rights and allows the jury to evaluate the witness's credibility. 38 The phrase "thing of value" contained within Section 201(c)(2) has
been broadly construed to include both tangibles and intangibles. 39 The
focal point should not be the actual value of the thing offered, but the

35

See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1996). Section 3553(e) provides: "[U]pon motion of

the Government, the court shall have the authority to impose a sentence below a level
established by statute as minimum sentence so as to reflect a defendant's substantial
assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an
offense." Id. See Lungstrom, supra note 3, at 751 (citing In re Sealed Case, 149 F.3d
1198, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting court may engage in downward departure from
statutory minimum sentence upon motion by government).
" See Boone v. Paderick, 541 F.2d 447, 451 (4th Cir. 1976) (noting promise of leniency creates incentive to curry favor with prosecutor leading to distorted testimony);
see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (discussing importance of
disclosure of material evidence which tends to exculpate defendant). But see United
States v. Meinster, 619 F.2d 1041, 1043-1044 (4th Cir. 1980) (noting incompatibility of
promises for leniency cases in Florida and North Carolina resulting in perjured testimony).
37
See United States v. Blackwood, 426 F.2d 526, 529 (4th Cir. 1972) (indicating
defendant's right to discredit testimony procured by government).
'"See id. (citing United States v. Campbell, 426 F.2d 547, 549 (2d Cir. 1970) (explaining rule allowing defendant to present evidence showing government made promises of leniency for cooperation); Campbell, 426 U.S. at 549 (noting defendant may
introduce evidence to show government promise of leniency creates bias). Nondisclosure of evidence affects witness credibility and justifies new trial irrespective of good
faith or bad faith of prosecution. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154-155. See also United States v.
Pope, 529 F.2d 112, 114 (1976) (noting inconsistency of fair trial demands when prosecuting attorney failed to disclose plea bargain arrangement); Campbell, 426 F.2d 547,
549 (2d Cir. 1970) (discussing fundamental importance of disclosure so jury can evaluate
credibility of witness).
" See United States v. Marmolejo, Jr., 89 F.3d 1185, 1192 (5th Cir. 1996) (acknowledging plain and unambiguous interpretation of statutory language applied by
courts regarding criminal laws); see also United States v. Nielsen, 967 F.2d 539, 542
(11 th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1034 (1993) (recognizing evolution of term
"thing of value" to encompass tangibles along with intangibles). The term "thing of
value" has been interpreted to include amusement, information and sexual intercourse.
Id.
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value the defendant subjectively places on the item.40 Furthermore, the
testimony must be given "for or because of" the item offered. 4' Prosecutors continue to enjoy substantial bargaining power as judicial deference to the negotiation process has created even greater flexibility with
potential witnesses. 42

III. ANALYSIS

A. Statutory Interpretationand Application of Section 201 (c)(2)
In Singleton, the court convicted a Kansas woman was for money
laundering and conspiring to distribute cocaine.43 The defendant appealed the conviction and on July 1, 1998 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the conviction through a novel interpretation of Section
201(c)(2).4 On rehearing en banc, however, the Tenth Circuit held the
term "whoever" does not include the United States acting in its sovereign
capacity. 45
Taking this narrow view of the statutory construction of Section
201(c)(2), it is apparent that laws that tend to restrain a sovereign's powers, rights, or interests do not apply to the government or affect governmental rights unless the text expressly dictates.4 There are two types of

See United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603, 622-23 (2d Cir. 1983) (explaining
broad meaning of term "anything of value" justifies subjective approach to item received).
41See United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 138 F.3d 961, 966
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting gift, offer or promise need not motivate given testimony). The
relationship may be merely one of reward and does not require quid pro quo scenario.
Id.
2
See Richman, supra note 5, at 85 (discussing prosecutorial control over plea
bargaining negotiations). Judicial deference to prosecutorial recommendations is a
common practice leading to greater flexibility in a negotiation process with potential
cooperators. Id.
4 See United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1298 (10th Cir. 1998).
"See id. (noting controversial holding of Court of Appeals finding § 201 (c)(2) not
applicable to government prosecutors).
See id. (holding government not included within § 201 (c)(2)).
See id. at 1300 (noting ambiguity in statutory interpretation); see also Lungstrom, supra note 3, at 758 (commenting on narrow, rigid reading of statute).
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cases when the government is presumptively excluded from general
statutory language.4 The first is where an act deprives the sovereign of a
recognized or established title or interest.4 The second class excludes
officers of the government from the statute where such a reading would
constitute an obvious absurdity. 49 The defense counsel viewpoint asserts
that if testimony induced from a defendant is tainted and unreliable, it is
no less tainted by the identical behavior of the prosecutor. 50
Defense attorneys believe liberty and security demand that government officials be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are demanded of them. 5' This disparity in power between prosecutor and defense attorney is justified by a disparity between roles and duties.5 2 A
majority of jurisdictions agree Section 201(c)(2) does not include the
include
United States acting in its sovereign capacity, and thus does not 53
assistant U.S. attorneys acting as an alter ego of the United States.
It should be noted that no other court in the thirty-six year history
of Section 201(c)(2) has prohibited to the prosecutorial grant of leniency

47

See Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 383-84 (1937) (expounding on ar-

eas where statutes are inapplicable to government).
" See id. at 383 (noting less stringent application of rule upon agents of government rather than upon sovereign).
See id. at 384 (noting speed laws applying to policeman pursuing criminal or fire
engine driver responding to alarm). Also included is the exemption of the state from
general statutes of limitation. Id.
' See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The court held:
[C]rime is contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds
contempt for law; ... it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare that the
government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution.
Id.

6,See id. (alleging government criminally liable under § 201(c)(2)).
'2 See Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 20, at 888 (delineating roles
of government prosecutor versus defense attorney). Typically, the portrayal of government prosecutors is that of advocates seeking justice while defense attorneys are portrayed as avoiding conviction at all costs. Id. at 889-90.
" See United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1302 (10th Cir. 1998) (setting
forth longstanding practice of government preclusion from § 201 (c)(2)); United States v.
Haese, 162 F.2d 359, 367-68 (5th Cir. 1998) (stressing any other interpretation would
"apply shackles" to government rendering every federal prosecutor criminally liable);
United States v. Ramsey, 165 F.3d 980, 986-87 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting established
historical acceptance of plea bargain arrangement).
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in exchange for truthful testimony. 4 The government concedes that the
term "whoever" is a broad term by its ordinary definition. 5 5 This broad
reading, however, ignores the capacity in which the government's lawyer
appears in the courts.5 6 Therefore, the government's sovereign authority
to prosecute and carry out necessary judicial proceedings vests solely in
Assistant U.S. Attorneys. 7
When an assistant U.S. attorney enters into a plea agreement with a
defendant, that plea agreement is between the United States government
and the defendant.5 8 To deprive the government of the opportunity to
plea bargain and obtain truthful testimony would eliminate a critically
important interest that is well established in our legal system.5 9 The
courts, Congress, and the U.S. Sentencing Commission have recognized
and accepted this concept60 Such recognition by the U.S. Sentencing
Commission creates the appearance of heightened power by the prosecutor, but, in actuality, the U.S. Sentencing Commission did not give the
prosecutor any discretion the prosecutor did not previously possess. 6 '

B. Threat of False Testimony
Despite the rejection of the Singleton rationale, courts have recognized the dangers of permitting Executive Branch officers to engage in
bargaining for testimony are as substantial as when the defendant does

"See Ramsey, 165 F.3d at 987 (commenting on historical acceptance of plea bargaining).
" See Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1305 (indicating broad parameters regarding general
use of term "whoever").
" See id. at 1299 (noting only officer of Department of Justice or U.S. Attorney
may represent the United States).
67See id. at 1300 (explaining government cannot exercise its powers on its own).
"See id. (recognizing U.S. attorneys act on behalf of United States).
"See Ramsey, 165 F.3d at 988 (indicating historical practice of exchanging leniency for truthful testimony).
" See id.; United States v. Ford, 99 U.S.594, 605 (1874); Lungstrom, supra note 3,
at 764; Richman, supra note 5, at 85 (setting forth historical acceptance of leniency for
testimony).
" See Standen, supra note 27, at 1502, 1506 (noting offense charged dictates sentence of crime while prosecutor controls severity of charge).
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the same. 62 Cross-examination determines the veracity of a witness
while a properly instructed jury determines the credibility of testimony.6 3
The jury instruction, however, does not eliminate the coercive nature of
the testimony. 64 It is difficult to imagine something of greater subjective
value to a defendant facing incarceration than the promise of a lesser
sentence. 65

IV. CONCLUSION
Exchanging leniency for testimony is a custom seemingly as old
as the law itself. While these deals are inherently suspect, this plea bargaining process has proven necessary to maintain our system of criminal
justice. Without plea bargains, our nation's courts would become endlessly bottlenecked. It would be impossible to try every case. One legal
scholar summed up the Singleton issue as "something between a serious
disruption and total upheaval." 6
The United States relies on witnesses who testify in return for leniency in thousands of cases each year. In a trial where stakes are high,
it makes sense for a defendant to minimize his or her losses by making a
deal with the prosecutor. Furthermore, it is necessary to maintain a
pragmatic approach to the concept of leniency for testimony and realize
that the pros far outweigh the cons. Application of Section 201(c)(2) to
the United States or Assistant U.S. Attorneys would deprive our country
of a critically important interest that has been well established in the
62See

Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1299 (alleging testimony coerced); United States v.

Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 313 (5th Cir. 1987) (addressing threat of false testimony).
6 See Cervantes-Pacheco,826 F.2d at 313 (explaining U.S. methodology regarding criminal trials); see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (holding
prosecutor's failure to disclose promise of leniency for testimony violated due process).
6 See United States v. Ortiz-Olivaras, 717 F.2d 1, 4 (1984) (noting proclivity of
defendant promised leniency to falsify evidence to curry favor with prosecutor); United
States v. Meinster, 619 F.2d 1041 1045 (1980) (emphasizing "promises of leniency or
immunity premised on cooperation may provide strong inducement to falsify"); Lungstrom, supra note 3, at 750 (realizing threat of false testimony).
65See Lungstrom supra note 3, at 752 (noting proclivity to engage in favorable
testimony to obtain leniency offered for substantial assistance).
" See David E. Rovella, Gail Diane Cox, Fallout From 'Singleton' Bribe Ruling,
Nat'l.L.J., August 24, 1998.
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courts, the Congress, and the United States Sentencing Commission.
While suppression of testimony may deter future misconduct, it would
also impede the judicial process by disallowing relevant evidence based
on the mere appearance of impropriety. The narrow statutory construction of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) proposed in Singleton restrains and diminishes the powers, rights and interests of the government and does not
constitute a practical legal approach to our system of criminal justice.
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